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Abstract This study extends a test for the presence of binding zoning,
originally developed to be applied across many adjacent
jurisdictions, so that it can be applied within a single jurisdiction.
This study also demonstrates how to carry out this test in the
presence of spatially correlated OLS residuals by using a mixed
effects model whose coefﬁcients are estimated using the
maximum likelihood technique. The study examines twenty
years of land sales data from a Midwestern county containing
two adjacent cities surrounded by rural areas. A thirty-ﬁve-acre
acre, minimum lot size in the rural area is found to be binding;
while a 9,000 square foot minimum lot size in the cities is found
to be not binding.
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Introduction
This study expands on an overlooked empirical test for binding large lot zoning
by extending its application from multiple to a single jurisdiction using a mixed
effects model. Originally the test was developed to apply across many
jurisdictions, each with a different minimum lot-size zoning ordinance. In this
study, the theory is extended to make the test applicable within a single
jurisdiction. The empirical model is also extended to include the possibility of
spatially correlated residuals.
Peterson (1974) explains that zoning ordinances can have three separate effects
on land values. First, municipalities may engage in ﬁscal zoning in an effort to
increase the per capita tax base or reduce the demand for municipal services.
Fiscal zoning can lower the property tax rate for any given set of municipal
services. This tax price-edge is likely to be capitalized into higher land values.
Second, zoning can limit the ways in which a parcel of land can be developed. If
the proﬁt maximizing use of a parcel of land is prohibited by a zoning ordinance,
the value of the parcel will be adversely affected. Third, externality zoning will398  Isakson
affect a parcel’s value by limiting the type of externalities to which the parcel is
exposed. This sort of zoning will enhance the value of the parcel.
In the aggregate, the effect of zoning on land values is not clear. The ﬁscal and
externality effects tend to enhance land values, while the land-use constraint effect
can lower land values. Peterson (1974) shows that one can focus on the land-use
constraint effect of large lot zoning by examining the sales of land zoned for a
particular use, such as single-family, for the presence of a binding zoning
constraint.
Zoning ordinances are not always binding constraints. Just because a large-lot
zoning ordinance places a limit on the minimum lot size in a community, it does
not automatically make that ordinance binding. Speciﬁcally, zoning laws are not
binding if they (1) do not inhibit the efﬁcient combination of land and other factors
in the production of buildings and (2) do not inhibit the efﬁcient allocation of
land among competing uses. On the other hand, if a zoning ordinance does inhibit
the free market outcome, then that ordinance is binding. This study examines only
large-lot zoning.
Zoning is a difﬁcult phenomenon to measure, much less test whether it is or is
not binding. Probably the oldest way of capturing the effects of zoning is to use
a series of dummy variables representing each zoning category. For example, Jud
(1980), Mark and Goldberg (1986) and Nicholas (1981) capture the effects of
zoning by using as many as seven dummy variables. But some researchers have
developed more innovative ways to measure zoning. For example, Shlay and Rossi
(1981) and Rolleston (1987) developed an index-of-restrictiveness measure to
capture the effects of zoning. This index is based on a weighted sum of the
percentages of land zoned at varying degrees of restrictiveness. McMillen and
McDonald (2002) look at zoning as an aggregate quantity restriction. But
restrictiveness models are not useful for testing whether or not a large lot zoning
ordinance is binding. Using an interesting model that examines the impact of
zoning on employment and population density, Frew, Jud and Wingler (1990)
report that zoning in Greensboro, North Carolina has a substantial impact on the
shape of urban density functions. But the Frew, Jud and Wingler model is not
designed for the study of the effect of zoning on land values.
Fortunately, tests for binding zoning have been conducted by others. These tests
focus on large lot zoning because it constitutes a form of zoning that is often
assumed to be binding, and because it appears to be an attempt by a city to exclude
undesirable residents. Using housing sales aggregated by census tract across
various metropolitan areas, Hamilton (1978) concludes that zoning is binding.
Fischel (1980) performs the same test within metropolitan areas and ﬁnds that
zoning is not binding. Using individual sales of single-family houses, some built
on land zoned single-family and some built on land zoned multi-family, Maser,
Riker and Rosett (1977) and Peterson (1974) also come to opposite conclusions.
It could be that zoning is binding in some areas and not others. Also, the ﬁscal
and externality effects of zoning might outweigh the land-use constraint effect.Analysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  399
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White (1988) shows that tests for the presence of a binding zoning ordinance
using sales of single-family homes are inherently biased. Presumably, land zoned
for multi-family use is more valuable than land zoned for single-family use. But
this differential is mitigated if a single-family house is built on land zoned for
multi-family use, because to realize the added value of the higher zoning, the
house must be demolished. The cost of demolishing the single-family house to
make room for a new multi-family structure will reduce the observed differential
in selling prices of single-family houses in studies like Maser, Riker and Rosett
(1977) and Peterson (1974). To avoid the bias present in sales of single-family
houses, a test for binding zoning must be conducted across sales of undeveloped
(no structures) land.
Grieson and White (1981) present a multi-market zoning model from which White
(1988) later derives an unbiased test for binding zoning. Unfortunately, no further
applications of the White test for binding zoning are reported in the literature.
Nonetheless, the question of binding zoning has serious implications for zoning
decision makers. If zoning ofﬁcials’ desire zoning laws that do not interfere with
the efﬁciency of the local real estate market, they should be aware of which of
their laws are binding. Similarly, if zoning ofﬁcials desire to restrain the local real
estate market, perhaps as a means of population control, they should be aware of
which of their laws are binding. So, regardless of the desires of zoning ofﬁcials,
knowledge of whether or not their zoning laws are binding is important
information. Thus, the test for binding zoning deserves further attention.
 Theory
The theory in this study builds on the multi-market model of zoning developed
in Grieson and White (1981) and White’s (1988) later extension of this model.
The presence of many autonomist communities, each with a different minimum
lot size ordinance, makes the White test possible. In this study, variation in
minimum lot sizes is achieved within a single jurisdiction by the presence of lots
smaller than the current minimum that were created under an older, less restrictive
zoning ordinance (e.g., parcels nonconforming to the existing minimum lot size
ordinance). In order to ﬁnd sales of these types of lots within a single jurisdiction,
the time frame of the analysis is extended with a two-fold adjustment process to
correct for market changes over the extended time frame.
The housing production function is deﬁned as H  H(T, K, L), where H is housing
measured in units of standardized service, T is land, K is capital and L is labor.
In short-run equilibrium, the price (per unit area)1 of land, r, will equal the value
of its marginal product in a competitive market, or r  Ph * MPT, where Ph is
the price of H and MPT is the marginal product of land. The location of any
parcel of land is deﬁned as S.
Next, assume that non-land subdivision costs (per unit land area) are constant,
regardless of the size of the tract of land being subdivided (H/K  0 and400  Isakson
H/L  0), and that premiums are not paid for one location over another (Ph/
S  0). Of course, these are unrealistic assumptions, but they help in
understanding the White test. Later, these assumptions will be relaxed. Now,
further assume that zoning is not binding. Under these assumptions, as White
(1988) shows, the price of land will not vary with lot size. That is, the price of
land is the same across all lot sizes and in all locations (Ph/T  0 and Ph/S
 0).
Next, one change is made in the above situation, namely that the zoning ordinance
is binding. A binding zoning ordinance forces the builder to use more land than
would be used without the ordinance. Therefore, the marginal productivity of land
is lower than it would be without the ordinance, or MPTb  MPTn, where the
subscript b denotes a binding ordinance and the subscript n denotes a non-binding
ordinance.
White (1988) adds to the above situation the presence of many contiguous
communities, each with a different minimum lot size ordinance, generating lots
of many different sizes across these communities. The many atomistic
communities generate a continuum of minimum lot sizes across the urban area.
However, unlike White, in this study the presence of lots of various sizes is
introduced in a different manner. In practice, zoning ordinances evolve over time.
In any given community, there often are parcels of various sizes smaller than that
required by the current ordinance. There might be many reasons why these smaller
lots remain empty. But whatever the reason, these types of parcels exist in many
communities.
With a binding zoning ordinance, a negative relationship between lot size and
price can be observed. Because the ordinance is binding, there will be a shortage
of smaller lots. Therefore, the price of the smaller lots will be driven upward, but
never so high that the value of the lot exceeds the value of a new, larger lot. In
White (1988), this phenomenon is driven by the presence of many communities
with different minimum lot size zoning ordinances. However, in this study, this
relationship is driven by the presence of smaller lots created under older zoning
ordinances. The approach in this study avoids the need to control for differences
in the various jurisdictions included in the White approach. Instead, this study
pools land sales across an extended period of time, controlling for market changes
over time with a two-step technique. However, in either approach, a binding-
zoning ordinance will create an inverse relationship between the price and lot size
of undeveloped (no structure) land.
But an inverse relationship between the price and lot size of undeveloped land
can also emerge if subdivision costs are not constant, as assumed earlier. In fact,
one would expect subdivision costs per unit area to increase as lot sizes become
smaller and smaller. For example, it is more costly per unit area to subdivide a
ten-acre tract of land into twenty lots than to subdivide it into ten lots. The costs
of utility lines, sewerage lines, water lines and possibly streets become greater asAnalysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  401
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Exhibit 1  Binding Zoning
the number of lots to be carved out of a given tract of land is increased. Thus,
although an inverse relationship between price and lot size is consistent with the
presence of binding zoning, it is also consistent with increasing subdivision costs
per unit area.
To separate these two effects requires the examination of land prices across parcels
of land that can be further subdivided (unsubdivided) and parcels that cannot be
further subdivided (subdivided). But to achieve this separation, a new variable is
needed to account for the fact that some parcels might be divisible into many
more parcels than others. To deal with this problem, White (1988) uses a variable
called ‘‘legal area.’’ The legal area of a parcel is the lot size that would result
after a parcel of land has been subdivided into the maximum number of equal
sized lots allowed by the zoning ordinance. In other words, legal area is the area
of the parcel divided by the whole number (integer) part of the ratio between the
parcel’s size and the minimum lot size. For example, a ﬁve-acre parcel zoned with
a two acre minimum lot size would have a legal area of 2.5 acres.2
When zoning is binding, the price—legal area relationship for subdivided land
will lie above and have a steeper slope than the price—legal area relationship for
unsubdivided land, as shown in Exhibit 1. In this study, a parcel can have a legal402  Isakson
area less than the minimum lot size only if it was created under an earlier zoning
ordinance that allowed smaller lot sizes. In this context, there will be no difference
between the two lines in Exhibit 1 if zoning is not binding. If subdivision costs
per unit area of land were constant across all parcel sizes and zoning was not
binding, then the price—legal area line (not drawn) in Exhibit 1—would be
horizontal. Thus, the comparison of subdivided with unsubdivided lots enables a
separation of the effects of a binding zoning ordinance from the effects of
subdivision costs.
The only ingredient not yet addressed is the importance of location. Earlier it was
assumed that location does not matter. However, in practice, location does matter.
Fortunately, Grieson and White (1981) demonstrate that including a location
variable in the model does not affect the price–legal area relationships. Of course,
location must still be controlled for within any empirical model, but it does not
affect the price–legal area relationships in Exhibit 1.
Testing for the presence of a binding zoning ordinance can be achieved by
examining the price–legal area relationship. The theoretical model upon which
this test is based is a partial equilibrium model. That is, it tests for the presence
of a binding zoning ordinance by examining how the price of a parcel of land
changes if the legal area of the parcel changes, ceteris paribus. One cannot use
this model to infer either the magnitude or direction of land price changes, in
general, if the legal area of many parcels were to change at once. Grieson and
White (1981) show that the effects of this sort of change are best understood
within the context of a general equilibrium model. Thus, testing for the presence
of binding zoning can be achieved using the above model, but the results of such
tests cannot be used to estimate what land prices would be with no zoning in the
market.
 The Empirical Model
The empirical model is developed for similarly (single-family) zoned land. The
variables are deﬁned as:
Ps,t  The log of the price of a parcel of land sold at location s and at time t;
s  The location of the parcel given by the state plane coordinates of the
centroid of the parcel;
t  The time of the sale;
L  The log of the legal area of the parcel as deﬁned above;
U  1 if the parcel is unsubdivided (number of maximum lots is at least 2);
k  An arbitrary constant term; and
es,t  A disturbance term deﬁned below.
Now, the theoretical relationship between price per acre and legal area can be
deﬁned as:Analysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  403
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p  k   U   L   UL   . (1) * s,t 12 3 s,t
For now, assume that the disturbance term has an expected value of zero with a
constant variance.
As White (1988) shows, the appropriate test for the null hypothesis that zoning
is not binding is:
    0. (2) 23
A negative sum of these two coefﬁcients is consistent with the presence of binding
zoning. Also, as White (1988) points out, the sign of 3 is positive if subdivision
costs are increasing. Thus, the effect of the zoning can be separated from the
effect of increasing subdivision costs by examining the sign of (2  3).
Additionally, a by-product of this test is a test (3  0) for the presence of increase
subdivision costs.
There are still two variables in the model that require attention. Speciﬁcally, the
time or the location of the sale should not bias the above test. The time of a sale
can be inﬂuenced at both the macro and micro levels. Speciﬁcally, changes in the
purchasing power of a dollar as well as local market trends can affect land prices.
Changes in the GDP Deﬂator are used to adjust for the former. Changes in local
market trends are more challenging to manage. In an experimental analysis of the
data, the use of dummy variables to divide the sales into numerous cohorts proved
to be statistically insigniﬁcant. Therefore, a continuous time variable is added to
the mean structure of the model to control for local market trends.
The location of a parcel can also affect its value in a macro and micro manner.
Location at the macro level is usually captured by accessibility variables. That is,
accessibility to a point of economic inﬂuence, such as the central business district
(CBD). The simplest measure of accessibility is distance. Although distance to a
nearby CBD is often used in many theoretical and empirical models, it is not
always the best construct to capture the macro level inﬂuences in small
communities. Knowledge of the area under study can prove invaluable toward
constructing variables that capture the macro level inﬂuences.
Next, S, a vector containing the appropriate measure(s) of accessibility, and t, the
time of sale, are added to the model. Also, ps is redeﬁned as the price of the
parcel in constant 1980 dollars (adjusted using quarterly GDP deﬂators). Thus,
the empirical model can be restated as:404  Isakson
p  k   U   L   UL   t   S   . (3) * s 12 3 4 5 s
Notice that the price and error terms still have a location (s) subscript, indicating
that additional, micro level location related inﬂuences might still be present in the
data.
This micro level inﬂuence is created by proximity to smaller but much closer
points of economic inﬂuence, such as a park, a golf course, a library, etc. These
micro level features are all but impossible to capture within the mean structure of
a model because they would involve adding many additional variables, most of
which would not be statistically signiﬁcant over an entire data set. A well-
established method for handling these micro level effects is to model them in the
disturbance term.3 However, sometimes the variables of this sort of mixed model
structure are difﬁcult to estimate. The approach taken in this study for dealing
with these micro level effects is described in the next section.
 Spatial Correlation
The presence of micro level location inﬂuences, even after including a macro
location variable in the model, can bias the coefﬁcient estimates of the model.
Speciﬁcally, if the disturbance term of a model such as in Equation (3) contains
a spatially correlated error term, the possibility of biased coefﬁcient estimates
exists. So, the ﬁrst step in dealing with this source of bias is to examine the
residuals of the empirical model for the presence of spatial correlation. If the
residuals are not spatially correlated, then no further steps are necessary. But if
they are spatially correlated, then it is necessary to check whether or not the
estimated coefﬁcients of the model, especially 2 and 3, are biased.
In order to explore the possibilities of spatially correlated residuals, the model
must be restated with a disturbance term capable of capturing spatial correlation.
Thus, consider the following geostatistical model:
p  k   U   L   UL   t   S  w(s), (4) s 12 2 4 5
where w(si)  N(0,2(, dij)), a spatial correlation term for the location si. Also,
(, dij) is deﬁned as a valid (positive deﬁnite) correlation function, dij as the
Euclidean distance between parcels i and j,  as a set of parameters controlling
the strength of spatial correlation, and w(si) as independent of i. The techniques
described in Isakson and Ecker (2001) are used to estimate the variogram
parameters (nugget, sill and range) representing w(s). Once these parameters are
estimated, the coefﬁcients of the mean structure of the model in Equation (4) areAnalysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  405
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re-estimated using the maximum likelihood technique. Comparing the OLS
parameter estimates of 2 and 3 to those obtained from Equation (4) provides a
test of whether or not the presence of the spatially correlated OLS residuals biases
the results of the test.
 The Data
The data in this study consists of 359 arms-length sales of vacant land, zoned
either agricultural or R-1 residential, that occurred in Black Hawk County, Iowa
between 1980 and 2000. The data was provided by the Black Hawk County Board
of Supervisors.4 Each transaction was screened by the County Information
Systems Department to insure them to be genuine arms-length transactions.
Certain political features relevant to zoning and land values in Black Hawk County
make it a desirable laboratory for testing whether or not local zoning ordinances
are binding. First, the zoning in the unincorporated (rural) areas of the county is
designed to protect farmland from urban sprawl. Since the 1960s, the minimum
lot size in the unincorporated parts of the county is thirty-ﬁve acres. The county
has no master plan, and the Board of Supervisors rarely approves requests to
rezone land into classiﬁcations that allow smaller lots. Some land in the
unincorporated areas does get rezoned for one and a half acre residential lots, but
the Board approves this type of zoning only for land with a very low crop growing
suitability rating. Some of the most expensive housing in the county is built on
one and a half acre rural lots. Given the policies of the county, one would expect
to ﬁnd the zoning in the rural areas to be binding, if the zoning ordinance is
indeed effective in protecting farmland from urban sprawl. On the other hand, if
the county’s large lot zoning is superﬂuous, it should be found to be non-binding.
Second, the two largest cities in the county, Cedar Falls and Waterloo, share a
common border, and their zoning ordinances are very similar; both have required
a 9,000 square foot minimum lot sizes for R-1 (single-family) land since the late
1960s. The land sales in the cities are limited to land zoned R-1. Additionally,
signiﬁcant acreage of vacant farmland is found in each city, all of it zoned
according to each city’s master plan. Subsequently, each master plan contains an
abundance of land zoned R-1 residential. With so much vacant land available for
subdivision, the zoning ordinances of these cities may very well be found to be
non-binding. Also, the land area of both cities and the rural areas did not change
during the study period due to land annexations.
Some of the geographic and transportation features of the county also make the
county an interesting laboratory. The terrain of the county is very ﬂat, with a
major river passing through it from its northwest to its southeast corner. A divided
highway parallels the river thru the two cities. Most of the older, industrial
development of the cities and most of the poorest farmland is located near the
river. Also, a major highway (Highway 20) passes through the southern half of
the county on an east–west line. The CBDs of each city are small and suffer from406  Isakson
Exhibit 2  Summary Statistics
Variable Min. Mean Max. Std. Dev.
Panel A: Rural Areas
Total price ($) 10,450 88,674 910,000 116,544
Price/Acre ($) 1,017 17,993 87,122 22,062
Size (acres) 0.188 33.203 374.240 56.196
Legal area (acres) 0.188 15.564 57.690 18.438
Time of sale* 1.241 17.100 20.562 3.167
Panel B: Cedar Falls
Total price 10,500 35,933 90,000 14,254
Price/Acre 6,920 86,338 256,699 46,968
Size (acres) 0.164 0.685 10.837 1.140
Legal area (acres) 0.164 0.257 0.400 0.048
Time of sale* 0.441 17.351 20.559 4.757
Panel C: Waterloo
Total price 10,500 29,165 117,000 19,652
Price/Acre 1,123 54,867 231,400 42,946
Size (acres) 0.160 1.541 24.040 3.124
Legal area (acres) 0.160 0.253 0.409 0.056
Time of sale* 0.359 15.038 20.573 5.751
Notes: Rural Areas: N  153; Cedar Falls: N  112; and Waterloo: N  94.
* Time is measured in years with January 1, 1980  0.
incipient decline. Although downtown businesspeople try from time to time to
revitalize the downtown areas, the downtown areas are not major destinations
points. One of the cities, Cedar Falls, is a small college town in which the travel
time from one side of the city to the other is about ten to ﬁfteen minutes. The
other city, Waterloo, is over twice as large, with no particularly important
destination points.
Exhibit 2 contains the descriptive statistics of the key variables in the model. The
largest variation in selling prices is found in the rural areas, probably because the
rural area sales have a very large variation in size. The largest variation in legal
area is also found in the rural areas, yet the variation in legal area in Cedar Falls
and Waterloo is relatively large. The sales are spread fairly evenly throughout the
three study areas, and the split between unsubdivided and subdivided parcels is
also fairly even within each study area.Analysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  407
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Exhibit 3  Zoning and Type of Land
Zoning Rural Areas Cedar Falls Waterloo
Panel A: Zoning
Agricultural 79 0 0
Residential 74 112 94
Panel B: Type of Land
Subdivided 76 61 36
Unsubdivided 77 51 58
Nonconforming 17 15 11
Exhibit 3 contains a summary of the zoning of the land sales, and the number of
sales of subdivided and unsubdivided land within each jurisdiction, and the
number of nonconforming parcels. None of the sales in the two cities are zoned
agricultural, while about half of the sales in the rural area are zoned residential.
In Iowa, property taxes are equalized across all property, but agricultural land is
always assessed based on its income-producing ability. Because the agricultural
land in the rural areas enjoys a slight tax advantage over the residential land, the
estimated zoning effects on value will represent conservative estimates.5
Due to the way the variable U is deﬁned, there is a chance that it will be highly
correlated with the variable L (legal area). Fortunately, the actual correlation
between U and L is very low (0.227). Thus, although U and L are slightly
correlated, this correlation is not expected to affect the estimates of the coefﬁcients
of the model.
Exhibit 4 shows the geographical distribution of the sales data, the boundaries of
the cities, the Cedar River and Highway 20. The rural sales surround the two
cities, but tend to be clustered near the northwest and southeast quadrants of the
county. Exploratory analysis of the data reveals that the traditional macro level
measure of location, proximity to a CBD, is not statistically signiﬁcant. However,
distance to the river and the east–west highway variables are statistically
signiﬁcant. Therefore, proximity to the river and the highway will be used as the
macro level location variables in the model.
 The OLS Results
Although it is possible to pool the data across jurisdiction as White (1988) did,
doing so forces the mean structure of the model and the error term to have the
same structure in all three jurisdictions (rural, Cedar Falls and Waterloo).408  Isakson
Exhibit 4  Geographical Distribution of Sales Data and Salient Points of Inﬂuence
Furthermore, pooling the data across multiple jurisdictions defeats one of the
purposes of this study, namely to avoid the problems associated with pooling land
sales data across multiple jurisdictions. Therefore, the coefﬁcients of Equation (3)
will be estimated separately for each of the three jurisdictions. Exhibit 5 contains
the coefﬁcient estimates for each of the jurisdictions. First and foremost, the OLS
estimates indicate that zoning in the rural areas is indeed binding as suspected,
while the zoning in both cities appears not to be binding. It appears that the
presence of considerable amounts of vacant, undeveloped land within each city is
sufﬁcient to prevent the 9,000 square foot minimum lot size from being binding.Analysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  409
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Intercept 92.212 5.54 125.538 1.14 249.296 2.34
Distance to River 0.082 4.96 0.112 1.05 0.230 2.24
Distance to Hwy 20 0.076 3.010 0.038 0.48 0.146 0.97
Time of Sale 0.025 1.34 0.023 2.56 0.061 3.58
Un (0, 1) 1.230 9.12 2.461 2.76 5.636 2.89
Log(Legal area) 0.665 16.81 0.310 1.05 0.486 0.83










*Indicates that (2  3) is statistically signiﬁcant at an   0.05 level.
Un  1 if the lot is unsubdivided, 0 otherwise. A lot is considered unsubdivided if it can be
legally split into at least two smaller lots.
The rest of the coefﬁcient estimates are also interesting. The two macro location
variables have mixed coefﬁcients. In Cedar Falls, neither of the macro location
variables is signiﬁcant, while in Waterloo only distance to the river is signiﬁcant
and has a negative coefﬁcient. In Waterloo, proximity to the river increases land
values, every thing else held constant. In Cedar Falls, proximity to the river or
Highway 20 has no effect. However, in the rural areas, proximity to the river and
Highway 20 are signiﬁcant. In the rural areas, proximity to the river increases
land values, while proximity to Highway 20 decreases land values. The pattern of
the signs and signiﬁcance of these estimates is not contrary to theory. Land near
the river is very poor at growing crops; it is the only type of land that the county
approves for subdivision into residential lots smaller than thirty-ﬁve acres.
Highway 20 is obviously more inﬂuential in the urban areas than in the cities,
and the sign of the coefﬁcient needs explanation. In the rural areas, proximity to
Highway 20 lowers land values, everything else held constant. Two features of
the market explain this phenomenon. First, rural land further south of the highway
has an increasing crop growing suitability rating. Second, rural land located north
of the highway is very near the two cities. Thus, proximity to the highway is
associated with higher land prices.
The time coefﬁcient estimate is also revealing. Recall that all of the sales prices
have been adjusted for inﬂation using the GDP Deﬂator. Thus, the time variable
is picking up any trend in real prices over the twenty-year time span in the data.
The coefﬁcient estimates show that real land values, everything else held constant,410  Isakson
Exhibit 6  Variogram
Panel A: Cedar Falls
Panel B: WaterlooAnalysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  411
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Exhibit 6  (continued)
Variogram
Panel C: Rural
are increasing in Cedar Falls, constant in the rural areas and declining in Waterloo
over the twenty-year time frame of the study. This pattern is not unexpected. Cedar
Falls is considered a white-collar community, while Waterloo is considered more
of a blue-collar community. Incomes in Cedar Falls were increasing, while
incomes in Waterloo were declining over the time frame of the study. Moreover,
as found in the experimental analysis mentioned earlier, these trends are indeed
continuous. That is, the trends do not display a change point over the time frame
of the study.
 The Maximum Likelihood Results
In the second phase of the analysis, the residuals are examined for signs of spatial
correlation. This examination is performed using variograms. Isakson and Ecker
(2001) demonstrate how to make use of a variogram to examine residuals for
spatial correlation. The variograms for the three study areas are portrayed in
Exhibit 6. Although all three variograms are somewhat different, they all indicate
the presence of spatially correlated residuals. Subsequently, each variogram is412  Isakson








Intercept 89.239 5.10 77.973 0.58 224.630 2.07
Distance to River 0.070 4.54 0.065 0.50 0.207 1.96
Distance to Hwy 20 0.067 2.58 0.022 0.24 0.138 0.88
Time of Sale 0.013 0.73 0.007 1.06 0.053 3.26
Un (0, 1) 1.180 8.96 2.437 3.09 5.432 2.84
Log(Legal area) 0.646 16.47 0.137 0.40 0.407 0.69










*Indicates that (2  3) is statistically signiﬁcant at an   0.05 level.
Un  1 if the lot is unsubdivided, 0 otherwise. A lot is considered unsubdivided if it can be
legally split into at least two smaller lots.
ﬁtted using the spherical functional form to obtain estimates of the nugget, sill
and range.6 The nugget is the intercept of the variogram with the vertical axis;
the sill is the value of gamma (plotted on the vertical axis) at the plateau reached
for large distances; and the range is the distance at which the variogram reaches
the sill.7
Maximum likelihood regressions are performed to estimate the coefﬁcients of the
mixed effects model. The mean structure of the mixed effects model is identical
to the mean structure of the OLS model. However, the structure of the disturbance
term is altered to match that of a spherical variogram with the three parameters
estimated above. The results of this analysis are reported in Exhibit 7. The most
important aspect of these results is that the estimates for 2 and 3 have not
signiﬁcantly changed. Therefore, the implications of the OLS analysis regarding
binding zoning have not changed. That is, the maximum likelihood results conﬁrm
that the presence of binding zoning the rural areas cannot be rejected, while in
the cities it can be rejected. The ﬁnding of increasing subdivision costs in all three
study areas is also not affected by the spatially correlated residuals.
However, the presence of spatial correlation in the OLS residuals did appreciably
change the signiﬁcance of some of the other variables. For example, the time
variable is now insigniﬁcant in Cedar Falls, but its signiﬁcance is unchanged in
Waterloo and the rural areas. There is also a slight change in the pattern of
signiﬁcance for the two macro level location variables. Distance to the river inAnalysis of the Effects of Large Lot Zoning  413
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Waterloo became barely (t 1.96) insigniﬁcant, while the signiﬁcance of the
two macro level location variables in the rural areas and Cedar Falls has not
changed.
In is important to note that the maximum likelihood estimates in Exhibit 6 should
not be considered ﬁnal estimates. In order to obtain more precise coefﬁcient
estimates, the maximum likelihood estimates should be used to estimate a new
set of residuals, which should be examined for spatial correlation. If spatial
correlation is still present, a new set of variogram parameters should be estimated
and plugged into another maximum likelihood regression. Ideally, this process
would continue until all of the spatial correlation is removed from the residuals.
But this iterative process is not warranted in this study, because the ﬁrst step in
the process revealed no signiﬁcant change in the key coefﬁcients, 2 and 3.I f
the focus of the study was the time coefﬁcient in Cedar Falls or the macro level
location variables in Waterloo, additional iterations would have been warranted.
But if there is no signiﬁcant change in a coefﬁcient of interest, there is no need
to perform additional iterations.
 Conclusion
This study extends the White test for the presence of binding zoning, which was
originally developed to be applied across multiple jurisdictions, so that it can be
applied within a single jurisdiction. The test is based on the relationship between
the selling price of a parcel of land and the parcel’s legal area. The legal area is
the average lot size that would result if the parcel were subdivided into as many
lots as legally permissible. The price–legal area relationship will differ between
parcels that can and cannot be subdivided into smaller parcels. When zoning is
binding, the price–legal area relationship for parcels already fully subdivided
should lie above and have a steeper slope than the price–legal area relationship
for land that can be further subdivided into smaller parcels.
Because this test needs many sales of parcels that are both fully subdivided, but
of various sizes, and parcels that are less than fully subdivided, many years of
land sales data are typically needed. This study applies the extended White test
to twenty years of land sales data drawn from a small Midwest county containing
two adjacent cities surrounded by rural land. The minimum lot size within the
rural area is large (35 acres) compared to the cities (9,000 square feet), suggesting
that the rural area zoning may be binding. Examination of the OLS estimates of
the key coefﬁcients of the model reveal the presence of binding zoning in the
rural area but not the cities.
However, to test for the presence of binding zoning requires unbiased estimates
of the key coefﬁcients of the price–legal area model. Simple OLS estimates of
these coefﬁcients can be biased by the presence of spatially correlated errors. Upon
examination of the error terms using the variogram technique, spatial correlation414  Isakson
is highly evident. Therefore, the OLS estimates might be biased. To determine the
extent of this bias, the coefﬁcients are re-estimated using a mixed effects model
in which the error term is structured to incorporate the spatial correlation reﬂected
by the variograms. The coefﬁcients of the mixed effects model are estimated using
the maximum likelihood technique. Although some of the OLS coefﬁcients were
found to be biased, the key coefﬁcients used to test for the presence of binding
zoning were found to be unbiased. The results support the conclusion that the
large lot zoning in the rural areas of the county is binding, while the minimum
lot size in the cities is not binding.
 Endnotes
1 Throughout this study the term ‘‘price’’ is used to denote the price per unit area, while
the term ‘‘value’’ is used to denote the total price of the parcel; value  price * area.
2 In this example, the maximum number of lots (the whole number part of ﬁve divided by
two) is two. The whole number (two) must be used because it is not possible to have
any parcel less than the minimum lot size. Therefore, the legal area of the ﬁve-acre parcel
is 5/2 acres or 2.5 acres.
3 See Gelfand, Ecker, Knight and Sirmans (2004) for additional discuss of this process.
4 The author thanks the Black Hawk County Board of Supervisors for their support of this
study. But the any opinions expressed in this study are strictly those of the author.
5 See Anderson (1999) and Turnbull (1988) for details.
6 The S statistical package with a spatial module is used to estimate the parameters of
the variogram.
7 See Wachernagel (1995) for further discussion of the nugget, sill and range parameters
of a variogram.
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